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I. INTRODUCTION
LTHOUGH this Survey period did not see significant develop-
ments in Texas state or federal franchise and business-opportu-
nity case law, Texas did make some noteworthy changes to many
of its dealership statutes, which are discussed in sections III and VI infra.
In addition, several United States Supreme Court cases and Texas cases
demonstrate how jurisdictional rulings continue to impact the manner in




This Survey period, a number of federal and state cases focused on
jurisdictional issues. Most notably, the United States Supreme Court
handed down decisions in two cases involving manufacturing and distri-
bution businesses, which will likely impact jurisdictional determinations
in future franchise and dealership disputes.
In Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, the Court asked:
"Are foreign subsidiaries of a United States parent corporation amenable
to suit in state court on claims unrelated to any activity of the subsidiaries
in the forum State?" 1 The dispute in Goodyear arose when two children
from North Carolina died in a bus accident in Paris that was allegedly
caused by a defective tire manufactured in Turkey.2 The children's par-
ents sued The Goodyear Tire and Rubber Company and three of Good-
year USA's foreign subsidiaries in North Carolina state court.3 The
Goodyear subsidiaries, incorporated in Luxembourg, Turkey, and France,
contested the personal jurisdiction of the North Carolina courts.4 They
argued that North Carolina's attempted exercise of jurisdiction was im-
proper because the Goodyear subsidiaries were not registered to do busi-
ness, did not have operations, did not advertise or solicit business, and did
not sell or ship tires (including the type of tire that allegedly caused the
Paris bus accident) in the state. 5
The North Carolina Court of Appeals held that the state court had
general jurisdiction over the Goodyear subsidiaries because they created
"continuous and systematic contacts" with the state by "plac[ing] their




5. Id. at 2852.
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tires 'in the stream of interstate commerce without any limitation on the
extent to which those tires could be sold in North Carolina.' 6 The North
Carolina Supreme Court did not review the case.7 In granting certiorari,
the United States Supreme Court considered the limits of general juris-
diction for only the third time since the landmark case of International
Shoe.8
In International Shoe, the Court held that the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment allows state courts to exercise jurisdiction
over nonresident defendants when the defendants have sufficient "'mini-
mum contacts"' with the state and jurisdiction complies with "'traditional
notions of fair play and substantial justice.' '" Specific jurisdiction is
proper under the Due Process Clause if the defendant engaged in "'con-
tinuous and systematic"' activity in the state in which litigation occurs
and "that activity gave rise to the episode-in-suit," or engaged in "'single
or occasional acts"' in the state and the lawsuit relates to those acts. 10 In
contrast, the Due Process Clause permits general jurisdiction over a party
even if there is no connection between the actual controversy and the
forum state in "instances in which the continuous corporate operations
within a state [are] so substantial and of such a nature as to justify suit
against it . . .11
In Goodyear, the Supreme Court unanimously determined that the
North Carolina appellate court erred in finding that the presence of a few
of the Goodyear subsidiaries' tires in North Carolina due to the "'stream
of commerce"' justified general jurisdiction over the Goodyear subsidiar-
ies. 12 A stream-of-commerce analysis can bolster a specific jurisdiction
determination, but is not relevant in evaluating whether general jurisdic-
tion exists. 13 The connection between the Goodyear subsidiaries and
North Carolina was "attenuated" and not of the "'continuous and sys-
tematic"' nature required to justify general jurisdiction over a party
under the Due Process Clause. 14 If the Court had affirmed the decision
of the North Carolina Court of Appeals, it would have created the unde-
sirable consequence that "any substantial manufacturer or seller of goods
would be amenable to suit, on any claim for relief, wherever its products
are distributed."1 5 Because the Goodyear subsidiaries were "in no sense
at home in North Carolina," the state courts did not have jurisdiction
6. Id. (quoting Brown v. Meter, 681 S.E.2d 382, 394 (N.C. Ct. App. 2009)).
7. Id. at 2853.
8. Id. at 2854 (citing Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952) and
Helicopteros Nacionales de Colom., S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408 (1984)); Int'l Shoe Co. v.
Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
9. Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2853 (quoting Int'l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316).
10. Id. (quoting Int'l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 317-18).
11. Id. (quoting Int'l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 318).
12. Id. at 2851 (quoting Brown v. Meter, 681 S.E.2d 382, 394-95 (N.C. Ct. App. 2009)).
13. Id. at 2855.
14. Id. at 2851, 2857.
15. Id. at 2856.
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over the subsidiaries "on claims unrelated to anything that connects them
to the State."' 16
The second United States Supreme Court case concerning jurisdiction
this Survey period was decided on the same day as Goodyear. A majority
of the Court determined that specific jurisdiction did not exist under the
facts of J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, but the Court was di-
vided in its rationale.' 7
McIntyre involved a products-liability suit filed in New Jersey state
court against a manufacturer from England, J. McIntyre Machinery. 18
The New Jersey courts rationalized exercising jurisdiction over McIntyre
because of its activities in the United States generally, including selling its
machines, sending company officials to trade shows, and seeking United
States patents for its technology.19 Up to four of McIntyre's machines
ended up in New Jersey through the stream of commerce.20 Although no
evidence showed McIntyre targeted New Jersey, the New Jersey courts
found that they could exercise jurisdiction because McIntyre distributed
its machines "'through a nationwide distribution system"' and did not
"'take some reasonable step to prevent the distribution of its products"'
in New Jersey.2 '
The United States Supreme Court reversed, finding New Jersey lacked
jurisdiction over McIntyre.2 2 Writing for the four-justice plurality, Justice
Kennedy noted that the general rule under the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment is that "the exercise of judicial power is not law-
ful unless the defendant 'purposefully avails itself of the privilege of con-
ducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and
protections of its laws." 23 The plurality noted that the New Jersey Su-
preme Court's reliance on the stream-of-commerce doctrine in a prod-
ucts-liability case like McIntyre was at odds with this purposeful-
availment principle because simply seeking to sell machines in the United
States did not reveal an intent to "invoke or benefit from the protection
of [New Jersey's] laws."'2 4
The Court speculated that its 1987 decision in Asahi "may be responsi-
ble in part" for the New Jersey Supreme Court's erroneous decision.25 In
Asahi, the portion of the opinion at issue in McIntyre was unable to com-
mand a majority. In his concurrence on behalf of four justices, Justice
16. Id. at 2857.
17. J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2785 (2011) (plurality opinion)
(Kennedy, J.); id. at 2791 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment).
18. Id. at 2786.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 2786.
21. Id. at 2786 (quoting Nicastro v. McIntyre Mach. Am., Ltd., 987 A.2d 575, 592
(2010)).
22. Id. at 2791.
23. Id. at 2785 (quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958)).
24. Id. at 2785, 2791.
25. Id. at 2786 (citing Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., Solano Cty.,
480 U.S. 102 (1987)).
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Brennan found that jurisdiction can arise from placing a product "'into
the stream of commerce"' because if a party knows that a product is mar-
keted in a particular state, it can foresee the possibility of a lawsuit
there.26 Justice O'Connor, writing the plurality opinion for four justices
on this issue, explained that putting a product in the stream of commerce
is insufficient to establish specific jurisdiction; rather, a defendant only
has the requisite minimum contacts with a forum state when it "'purpose-
fully direct[s]"' action toward the state.27
The plurality in McIntyre rejected Justice Brennan's "rule based on
general notions of fairness and foreseeability," and adopted Justice
O'Connor's requirement of purposeful availment, finding it more consis-
tent "with the premises of lawful judicial power. '2 8 The question, the
plurality explained, is "whether a defendant has followed a course of con-
duct directed at the society or economy existing within the jurisdiction of
a given sovereign, so that the sovereign has the power to subject the de-
fendant to judgment concerning that conduct. '29
Justices Breyer and Alito concurred in the McIntyre judgment, but de-
clined to announce "a rule of broad applicability without full considera-
tion of the modern-day consequences" and without the participation of
the Solicitor General.30 Justice Breyer explained that it was proper to
reverse the New Jersey decision simply because Nicastro did not show
jurisdiction was constitutionally proper under existing precedent. 31 In
Justice Breyer's view, under existing precedent, a "single isolated sale" is
insufficient to establish jurisdiction, and the facts as stated by the New
Jersey Supreme Court did not show anything more. 32
In addition to these two important decisions, federal and state courts in
Texas and the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania also considered how jurisdictional issues relate to franchises
and dealerships in Texas.
Orazi v. Hilton Hotels Corp. involved a negligence and loss-of-consor-
tium action resulting from a slip-and-fall at a Hampton Inn franchise ho-
tel in Allen, Texas.33 The plaintiffs brought suit in Pennsylvania state
court. After removing the case to federal court, the Texas hotel and its
franchisee owner moved to dismiss the suit for lack of personal
jurisdiction.34
The court found that the plaintiff's complaint did not establish either
general or specific jurisdiction over Hampton Inn, a corporate citizen of
Delaware located in Allen, Texas, or Allen Stacy, a Hilton franchisee in-
26. Id. at 2788 (quoting Asahi, 480 U.S. at 117).
27. Id. at 2788-89 (quoting Asahi, 480 U.S. at 112).
28. Id. at 2789, 2790.
29. Id. at 2789.
30. Id. at 2791, 2794.
31. Id. at 2791.
32. Id. at 2792.
33. Orazi v. Hilton Hotels Corp., No. 09-cv-05959, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 123472, at
*2 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 22, 2010).
34. Id. at *4-5.
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corporated in Texas. 35 In some cases, a court can impute to the defen-
dant the contacts of a different defendant or a nonparty to establish
jurisdiction (for example, imputing to the principal the contacts of an
agent that is empowered to bind the principal, or imputing to the princi-
pal the contacts of an agent when the agent performs services that the
principal would otherwise have to perform). 36 The court in Orazi, how-
ever, refused to impute Hilton's contacts to Hampton Inn or to Allen
Stacy simply because the plaintiffs booked their hotel room on the Hilton
or Hampton Inn website and Philadelphia-area Hampton Inns engaged in
some advertising and promotion of rewards and loyalty programs that
potentially benefited the Hampton Inn in Allen, Texas. 37 Even though
Allen Stacy authorized Hilton to make reservations on its behalf, the re-
cord was not clear regarding whether Allen Stacy was bound by the reser-
vation without confirming it.38 Therefore, the court could not determine
if a binding agency relationship existed.39 It could only confirm that
Hilton and Allen Stacy had "a franchise relationship that involve[d] some
services."'40 It would violate due process to find that relying on a "system
of common advertising and branding-typical of most franchised busi-
nesses"-would allow a court with jurisdiction over a franchisor to auto-
matically have jurisdiction over one of its franchisees.41 On the facts
alleged, neither general nor specific jurisdiction was appropriate for
Hampton Inn or for Allen Stacy.42
Despite not finding a prima facie showing of jurisdiction over Hampton
Inn and Allen Stacy, the court in Orazi found that the plaintiffs were
"entitled to jurisdictional discovery limited to information regarding De-
fendants' contacts with Pennsylvania and the relationship between and
among the Defendants. '43 This limited discovery was appropriate be-
cause the plaintiffs pled sufficient facts to show that there could be rela-
tionships that established jurisdiction. 44 The court waited to determine
the appropriateness of the motion to change venue until the end of juris-
dictional discovery. 45
In Dontos v. Bruno, the Dallas Court of Appeals affirmed the trial
court's order that it did not have personal jurisdiction over the defendant,
Mark Bruno.46 The plaintiff, Dontos, was a franchisee of 24/seven Vend-
ing USA Limited, New Zealand ("24/seven"). 47 Bruno, a resident of
Connecticut, was the president of a company that also licensed the 24/
35. Id. at *11-12.
36. Id. at *8-9.
37. Id. at *11-12, 29, 33-34.
38. Id. at *15, 18.
39. Id. at *15, 18-19.
40. Id. at *20.
41. Id. at *22.
42. Id. at *13, 30.
43. Id. at *34-35.
44. Id. at *35-36.
45. Id. at *44-45.




seven brand name. 48 When 24/seven stopped supporting its franchisees
near Dallas, Bruno had some limited interactions with Dontos.49 Bruno
was not a party to the franchise agreement with Dontos, not an employee
of 24/seven or of the bank supplying a loan to Dontos, and not a former
owner or seller of Dontos's franchise or vending routes.5 0
State statutory and federal due process requirements only allow courts
to exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant if the de-
fendant has minimum contacts with Texas and the exercise "does not of-
fend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. '51 The
minimum-contacts requirement is satisfied by a nonresident defendant's
purposeful availment of the forum state.52 Purposeful availment occurs
when the defendant's contacts show that the defendant is purposefully
seeking a "benefit, advantage or profit" in the jurisdiction.53 In this case,
specific jurisdiction was inappropriate because Dontos did not "establish
any substantive connection between Bruno's contacts with Texas and the
operative facts of the litigation. ' 54 The court of appeals affirmed the trial
court's order to dismiss.55
The Eastern District of Texas considered the question of how to allo-
cate jurisdiction between court and administrative proceedings in Ford
Motor Co. v. Bob Tomes Ford, Inc.56 In a dealership dispute, Ford Motor
Company alleged that the dealer, Bob Tomes Ford, Inc., breached its
dealership contract by selling Subaru vehicles when the contract provided
that the dealership would be exclusively for Ford, Lincoln, and Mercury
vehicles. 57 Tomes moved to dismiss the suit Ford brought in federal court
because it had already initiated an administrative proceeding with the
Texas Motor Vehicle Commission to stop Ford's purported attempt to
terminate Tomes's Lincoln franchise. 58
The court had to consider whether it had jurisdiction over the dispute
and, if so, whether the Commission should resolve the dispute.59 The
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 779, 781.
51. Dontos, 339 S.W.3d at 780 (citing Helicopteros Nacionales de Colom., S.A. v. Hall,
466 U.S. 408, 414 (1984)). In order for a Texas court to exercise personal jurisdiction over
a nonresident defendant, the jurisdiction must be (1) authorized by the Texas long-arm
statute and (2) consistent with the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See
CSR Ltd. v. Link, 925 S.W.2d 591, 594 (Tex. 1996) (orig. proceeding). Since the Texas
Supreme Court has interpreted Texas's long-arm statute to "reach as far as the federal
constitutional requirements of due process will allow," Texas courts can and often do skip
the first step. Retamco Operating, Inc. v. Republic Drilling Co., 278 S.W.3d 333, 337 (Tex.
2009).
52. Dontos, 339 S.W.3d at 780 (citing Moki Mac River Expeditions v. Drugg, 221
S.W.3d 569, 575 (Tex. 2007)).
53. Id. (emphasis added).
54. Id. at 781.
55. Id. at 779.
56. Ford Motor Co. v. Bob Tomes Ford, Inc., No. 4:10cv482, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
135092, at *3-4 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 21, 2010) (mem. op.).
57. Id. at *1.
58. Id. at *2-3.
59. Id. at *3-4.
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court noted that under the exclusive jurisdiction doctrine, "the Legisla-
ture grants an administrative agency the sole authority to make an initial
[jurisdictional] determination. '60 However, if the statutory construction
is less clear, and both a court and an agency could have authority to make
an initial jurisdictional determination, trial courts allocate power based
on the primary jurisdiction doctrine. 61
In Ford, the statute at issue was section 2301 of the Texas Occupations
Code, pertaining to the Sale or Lease of Motor Vehicles.62 Section
2301.151(a) provides that "[t]he board has the exclusive original jurisdic-
tion to regulate those aspects of the distribution, sale, or lease of motor
vehicles that are governed by this chapter, including the original jurisdic-
tion to determine its own jurisdiction. '63 Considering that the claims at
issue in the dispute (regarding whether Tomes violated his franchise
agreement) related to provisions under section 2301, the court deter-
mined that the Commission had exclusive jurisdiction and recommended
that the case be dismissed. 64
The lessons from these cases are at least twofold: 1) a litigant should
always challenge jurisdiction in a venue in which it has not purposefully
availed itself of the laws of that jurisdiction; and 2) if an administrative
agency has exclusive original jurisdiction, the litigant should take care to
file in the proper venue in order to avoid incurring fees over a losing
venue squabble.
B. FORUM SELECTION
In Safety-Kleen Systems, Inc. v. McCoy Freightliner, Inc., a truck deal-
ership defendant located in West Virginia moved to dismiss for lack of
personal jurisdiction a lawsuit filed in Texas regarding money allegedly
owed for clean-up services after an oil spill.65 The plaintiff contended
that a forum-selection clause in an agreement signed by the defendant
after the start of the clean-up services provided for jurisdiction in Texas.66
The court in Safety-Kleen reminded litigants that freely signing a rea-
sonable forum-selection clause shows that a party "has either consented
to personal jurisdiction or waived the requirements for personal jurisdic-
tion in that forum. ' 67 Under federal law, the presumption is that forum-
60. Id. at *5.
61. Id. at *4. Under the primary jurisdiction doctrine, trial courts defer to administra-
tive agencies when: "(1) an agency is typically staffed with experts trained in handling the
complex problems in the agency's purview; and (2) great benefit is derived from an
agency's uniformly interpreting its laws, rules, and regulations, whereas courts and juries
may reach different results under similar fact situations." Id.
62. Id. at *5-6.
63. Id. at *6 (citing TEx. Occ. CODE ANN. § 2301.151 (West 2012)).
64. Id. at *7.
65. Safety-Kleen Sys., Inc. v. McCoy Freightliner, Inc., No. 4:10-CV-608, 2011 WL
665812, at *1 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 21, 2011) (adopted by United States District Judge Michael H.
Schneider on February 14, 2011 (Safety-Kleen Sys., Inc. v. McCoy Freightliner, Inc., No.
4:10-CV-608, 2011 WL 2009958, at *1 (E.D. Tex. Apr. 11, 2011))).
66. Id.
67. Id. at *3 (citing Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 473 n.14 (1985)).
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selection clauses are enforceable, and a party seeking to overcome the
presumption must prove that the clause is "unreasonable under the
circumstances. "68
Although a federal court must apply federal law to determine whether
a forum-selection clause is enforceable, it applies state law to determine
whether a party agreed to the clause.69 Under Texas Law, contract terms
"are given 'their plain and ordinary meaning unless the instrument indi-
cates the parties intended a different meaning."' 70 In Safety-Kleen, the
contract and the clause were not ambiguous.71 Additionally, there was
no evidence that the forum-selection clause was not freely negotiated,
was unreasonable or unjust, or was the result of fraud or overreaching.7 2
Even though a Texas court ordinarily would not have personal jurisdic-
tion over the defendant, the court found the forum-selection clause was
enforceable and, therefore, jurisdiction was proper.73
Nearly three months after upholding personal jurisdiction on the basis
of the forum-selection clause, the magistrate judge in Safety-Kleen looked
at whether the forum-selection clause in the contract at issue precluded
the defendant, McCoy, from transferring venue.74 The court noted a fo-
rum-selection clause can be a mandatory clause, which permits jurisdic-
tion only in the designated forum, or a permissive clause, which
"authorize[s] jurisdiction in the designated forum, but do[es] not prohibit
litigation elsewhere."'75
The court in Safety-Kleen determined the forum-selection clause in the
contract at issue was permissive because it showed that the parties con-
sented to jurisdiction in Texas, but it did not state that adjudication in
Texas was mandatory. 76 Since the motion to transfer venue was not pre-
cluded by a mandatory venue in the forum-selection clause, the court
went on to consider whether transferring venue would serve the "interest
of justice," as required by 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a).77 After analyzing the fac-
tors enumerated by the Fifth Circuit in Volkswagen H,78 the court deter-
mined the defendant had not satisfied the heavy burden of analyzing each
68. Id. at *4.
69. Id. (internal citations omitted).
70. Id. at *6 (quoting Dynegy Midstream Servs., Ltd. P'ship v. Apache Corp., 294
S.W.3d 164, 168 (Tex. 2009)).
71. Id. at *5-6.
72. Id. at *6-7.
73. Id. at *7.
74. Safety-Kleen Sys., Inc. v. McCoy Freightliner, Inc., No. 4:10-CV-608, 2011 WL
2009958, at *3 (E.D. Tex. Apr. 11, 2011).
75. Id. at *4.
76. Id. The forum selection clause at issue stated: "This Agreement shall be inter-
preted and enforced according to the Laws of the State of Texas and the parties agree to
submit to the jurisdiction of the courts of the State of Texas for any disputes arising under
this Agreement." Id.
77. Id. at *2, 5.
78. In re Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 545 F.3d 304, 315 (5th Cir. 2008) (en banc).
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of those factors and showing that the transfer would be "clearly more
convenient," and denied the motion.79
C. ARBITRATIONS
In The Salad Bowl Franchise Corp. v. Mason Crane,8 0 Chief Judge Fitz-
water of the United States District Court for the Northern District of
Texas granted a motion for a preliminary injunction that the plaintiff, The
Salad Bowl Franchise Corporation, brought alongside its motion to com-
pel arbitration.8 1
Salad Bowl's franchise agreement contained clauses stating that all dis-
putes would be governed by Texas law and resolved through arbitration
in the city of the franchisor's principal offices, which was Dallas, Texas.8 2
When the franchisee's limited liability company fell behind on rent for its
restaurant in Albuquerque, New Mexico, Salad Bowl terminated the
franchise agreement.8 3 The franchisee contested the termination and al-
leged claims of its own; as a result, Salad Bowl initiated arbitration pro-
ceedings in Dallas.8 4 Although the parties engaged in arbitration, the
franchisee never signed the proposed settlement agreement.8 5 Two
months after the initiation of arbitration, the franchisee and its two mem-
bers filed suit in New Mexico state court.8 6 In response, Salad Bowl filed
in the Northern District of Texas a petition to compel arbitration and a
motion for a preliminary injunction of the New Mexico proceedings.8 7
The court observed that the Federal Arbitration Act "leaves no place
for the exercise of discretion by a district court, but instead mandates that
district courts shall direct the parties to proceed to arbitration on issues as
to which an arbitration agreement has been signed."88 In this case, the
court found that the agreement was valid under Texas law and that three
arbitration provisions in the contract clearly showed that the parties
agreed to arbitration.8 9 The language of the arbitration clauses was
"broad" and encompassed the dispute in question. 90 When arbitration
clauses are broad, they "are not limited to claims that literally arise under
the contract, but rather embrace all disputes having a significant relation-
ship to the contract regardless of the label attached to the dispute." 9 '
79. Safety-Kleen, 2011 WL 2009958 at *2, 5-7.
80. The Salad Bowl Franchise Corp. v. Crane, No. 3:11-CV-0043-D, 2011 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 27406, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 17, 2011).
81. Id.
82. Id. at *2-4.
83. Id. at *3.
84. Id. at *4.
85. Id. at *4-5.
86. Id. at *5.
87. Id.
88. Id. at *9 (internal quotation marks omitted).
89. Id. at *11.
90. Id. at *12 (noting that the arbitration clauses referred to "all claims arising out of
or relating to th[e] Agreement" and "any disputes arising between Franchisor and
Franchisee.").
91. Id. at *13 (internal citations omitted).
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When it is unclear, a clause "should be construed in favor of
arbitration." 92
The court held that the individuals who did not sign the agreement in
their individual capacities were bound by the arbitration provisions under
the doctrine of equitable estoppel.93 Prior Fifth Circuit precedent allows
"a signatory to compel another signatory to submit to arbitration against
a non-signatory, so long as it is on the subject matter covered under the
Agreement and the non-signatory is being sued for his acts as agent for
the signatory."' 94 The disputes in the New Mexico lawsuit were all related
in some way to the franchise agreement, and so the defendants in the
Northern District of Texas were equitably estopped from claiming that
they were not required to arbitrate the dispute. 95
The court determined that the factors a court must consider when a
party seeks a preliminary injunction along with another motion-like a
motion to compel arbitration-were satisfied here.96  Among other
things, irreparable injury would result if the parties were not required to
arbitrate because Salad Bowl would then "be deprived of its right to se-
lect the forum in which the disputes are resolved-a deprivation that can-
not be remedied merely by monetary compensation. '9 7 The court found
this injury and others that the franchisor would face if forced to litigate in
New Mexico-despite contracting for another mode of resolution-far
outweighed the risk of delay of the state court litigation that would result
to the franchisees if the franchisor failed to compel arbitration. 98 Addi-
tionally, due to the "'strong federal policy favoring arbitration over litiga-
tion,"' 99 granting the preliminary injunction would "not disserve the
public interest." 100
Salad Bowl reinforced how highly courts in the Fifth Circuit and in
Texas regard arbitration. Courts are extremely reluctant to interfere
when a franchise or dealership agreement contains a valid arbitration
clause. Courts are involved, however, in determining whether an arbitra-
tion agreement is valid and enforceable. Practitioners should understand
that a valid arbitration clause in an agreement-franchise or otherwise-
92. Id. at *13-14 (internal citations omitted).
93. Id. at *15.
94. Id. at *16.
95. Id. at *14-22.
96. Id. at *8, 26 (citing Jones v. Bush, 122 F. Supp. 2d 713, 718 (N.D. Tex. 2000) (Fitz-
water, J.), aff'd, 244 F.3d 134 (5th Cir. 2000) (per curium) (unpublished table decision)).
The factors are: "(1) a substantial likelihood that it will prevail on the merits; (2) a substan-
tial threat that it will suffer irreparable injury if the injunction is not granted; (3) that the
threatened injury to it outweighs the threatened harm the injunction may do to defendants;
and (4) that granting the preliminary injunction will not disserve the public interest." Id. at
*8.
97. Id. at *22-23.
98. Id. at *24-25.
99. Id. at *25 (quoting City of Meridian v. Algernon Blair, Inc., 721 F.2d 525, 529 (5th
Cir. 1983)).
100. Id. at *25.
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will most likely be enforced, as there is a strong presumption in favor of
these clauses.
In Texas La Fiesta Auto Sales, LLC v. Belk, the court reminded parties
that both federal and Texas courts will not apply the presumption in favor
of arbitration until "the party seeking to compel arbitration proves that a
valid arbitration agreement exists."'10 1 Texas La Fiesta concerned an em-
ployment dispute at a car dealership. 10 2 At issue were two arbitration
clauses-the first in a stand-alone arbitration agreement, and the second
in an employment contract that contained a merger clause. 10 3 It was im-
portant to determine which, if any, clause applied to the case because the
clauses provided for arbitration governed by different laws-the first
under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) and the second under the Texas
Labor Code.10 4 The Houston Court of Appeals first determined it had
jurisdiction over the interlocutory appeal because the trial court denied
the appellant a potential contractual right of arbitration under the
FAA.10 5 Next, it found that the trial court was correct in ordering an
evidentiary hearing to determine whether a valid arbitration agreement
existed. 106 The trial court needed to answer the legal question of whether
there was a valid arbitration provision, and particularly, if the provision in
the employment contract superseded the stand-alone arbitration agree-
ment.10 7 Finally, the court found the trial court did not err in ordering
arbitration pursuant to the clause in the employment contract after deter-
mining that it superseded the clause in the arbitration agreement. 10 8 That
determination depended heavily on the facts of Texas La Fiesta, and was
appropriate even though the plaintiff had initially only moved to compel
arbitration under the first agreement. 10 9
In Dealer Computer Inc. v. Michael Motor Co., the court reviewed an
arbitration award after it had been rendered. 110 It acknowledged that
courts have narrow discretion in judicially reviewing the results of arbi-
tration for fundamental unfairness."' It chose to vacate an arbitration
award that would have required a car dealership to pay damages and at-
torneys' fees to a company that provided computer services to dealer-
ships.1'2 The justification behind the court's action was the allowance in
101. Texas La Fiesta Auto Sales, LLC v. Belk, 349 S.W.3d 872, 880 (Tex. App.-Hous-
ton [14th Dist.] 2011, no pet.) (citing J.M. Davidson, Inc. v. Webster, 128 S.W.3d 223, 227
(Tex. 2003)).
102. Id. at 876.
103. Id. at 875-76.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 878.
106. Id. at 883.
107. Id. at 880.
108. Id. at 884.
109. Id. at 883-84.
110. Dealer Computer Servs., Inc. v. Michael Motor Co., 761 F. Supp. 2d 459, 461-64
(S.D. Tex. 2010).
111. Id. at 464.
112. Id. at 460-61.
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the FAA to vacate arbitration awards "where there was evident partiality
or corruption in the arbitrators, or either of them." 113
The parties had contractually agreed to arbitrate any disputes between
them.114 A dispute arose, and a panel of "three neutral arbitrators"
formed and eventually held in favor of the computer company.11 5 Al-
though the arbitrator appointed by the computer company revealed to
the AAA that she had served on another panel involving a dispute with
the computer company, she did not clarify that the prior arbitration in-
volved "a contract nearly identical to the one at issue in the Michael Mo-
tor Arbitration," the same damages expert, and two additional witnesses
that were not designated in the Michael Motor arbitration." 6
The court found that when there is suspicion of "evident partiality or
corruption in the arbitrators," parties do not need to prove actual bias;
rather, "evident partiality" can exist if the arbitrator does not disclose a
"significant compromising connection to the parties." 117 Applying that
standard to the facts of this case, the court found evidence of evident
partiality because the arbitrator's exposure to the facts and evidence 'in
the prior arbitration "create[d] a reasonable impression that she had
prejudged at least some of the issues in the arbitration."118 Michael Mo-
tor did not waive the right to object to the arbitrator's evident partiality,
despite not raising an objection before the arbitration award, because
Michael Motor "did not have sufficient information to object during the
arbitration."' 19
III. THE FRANCHISE RELATIONSHIP, TERMINATION,
AND NON-RENEWAL
The 82nd session of the Texas Legislature saw a large amount of activ-
ity in the dealer and distributor area. There were significant statutory
developments concerning motor-vehicle dealers, boat dealers, and
"equipment" dealers during the Survey period. Some of the most conse-
quential of these developments concern the right to terminate a dealer-
ship or distributorship.
A. THE FAIR PRACTICES OF EQUIPMENT MANUFACTURERS,
DISTRIBUTORS, WHOLESALERS, AND DEALERS ACT
In 2011, Texas passed the Fair Practices of Equipment Manufacturers,
113. Id. at 464.
114. Id. at 460-61.
115. Id. at 461.
116. Id. at 461-63.
117. Id. at 464-65 (citing Positive Software Solutions, Inc. v. New Century Mortg. Corp.,
476 F.3d 278, 282-83, 285 (5th Cir. 2007) (en banc); Fidelity Fed. Bank, FSB v. Durga Ma
Corp., 386 F.3d 1306, 1312 (9th Cir. 2004)).
118. Id. at 465.
119. Id. at 467 (declining to decide if a party must have "actual knowledge" of conflict




Distributors, Wholesalers, and Dealers Act.120 The Act adds Chapter 57
to the Texas Business and Commerce Code. The new statute not only
includes an anti-waiver provision, but also provides that the choice of any
other state's law besides that of Texas is void, and that any provision in a
contract that requires a dealer to pay attorneys' fees incurred by an
equipment supplier is void. 121 Presumably, suppliers would still be able
to take advantage of Chapter 38 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies
Code to recover fees should there be a suit based on the agreement itself.
The new law applies to persons who are "primarily" engaged in the
business of selling, leasing, repairing, or servicing "equipment," as well as
persons that manufacture or distribute "equipment. ' 122 "Equipment" is
defined to include products used in connection with agriculture, raising
livestock, landscaping, and "industrial, construction, maintenance, min-
ing, or utility activities or applications.' 1 23 These are very broad terms,
especially the "industrial," "construction," and "maintenance" categories,
none of which are defined further. Note that some of the categories cov-
ered by the new statute, most notably farm implements and tractors, were
covered by Chapter 55 of the Business and Commerce Code, which the
new law repeals.' 24 The new statute uses much broader terms, however,
and includes "for, or in connection with" language that could catch some
businesses that may seem outside the statute's coverage.1 25
There are various provisions regulating the sale or transfer of a dealer-
ship, as well as a requirement that a dealership cannot be terminated ab-
sent good cause as defined by the statute. 126 The statute makes a
distinction for "single-line" dealers, which, in general, obtain at least sev-
enty-five percent of their equipment from one supplier and meet certain
minimum sales volume requirements. 27 "Good cause" is defined in part
for non-single-line dealers to include the dealer failing "to substantially
comply with essential and reasonable requirements imposed on the
dealer under the terms of the dealer agreement," which is potentially
open to a wide range of interpretation. 128 The notice of termination must
be sent at least 180 days before the effective date of termination, with a
mandatory 60-day cure period.' 29 For single-line dealers, the statute
leaves out the "essential and reasonable requirements" language and has
only a 90-day notice requirement. a30 Finally, the statute includes multiple
120. Fair Practices of Equipment Manufacturers, Distributors, Wholesalers, and Deal-
ers Act, 82d Leg., R.S., ch. 1039, §§ 1-5, 2011 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 1901, 2645 (West) (cur-
rent version at TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 57.001-57.402 (West Supp. 2011)).
121. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 57.003, 57.051 (West Supp. 2011).
122. Id. § 57.002(3), (20).
123. Id. § 57.002(7).
124. Fair Practices of Equipment Manufacturers, Distributors, Wholesalers, and Deal-
ers Act, 82d Leg., R.S., ch. 1039, § 3.
125. Id. § 2.
126. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 57.101-03, 57.153, 57.202.
127. Id. § 57.002(15).
128. Id. § 57.154(a)(1).
129. Id. § 57.155(a).
130. Id. §§ 57.203-04.
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sections dealing with warranty claims and the return of equipment, and it
provides for a private cause of action for a dealer against a supplier which
may include an award of attorney's fees and costs.1 31
B. MOTOR VEHICLE DEALER STATUTE
Texas also amended its motor-vehicle dealer statute in 2011.132 The
most notable change to this statute is the addition of a requirement that a
manufacturer make additional payments to a dealer when terminating the
dealer in certain circumstances. 133 The new payment requirements apply
when a dealer is terminated because the manufacturer discontinues a
product line, ceases to do business in Texas, changes the "distributor or
method of distribution" in Texas, or does not comply with the statute's
established requirements for termination. 134 The required payments in-
clude reimbursement for construction costs if a new dealership is com-
pleted within two years of the termination, costs of upgrading or altering
the dealership within two years of termination, and the value of the good-
will associated with the franchise as of either the date of termination or
the date the manufacturer announced the intention to terminate. 135
These changes, which only affect agreements entered into or renewed af-
ter September 1, 2011,136 appear motivated by recent economic difficul-
ties experienced in the automotive industry, and will work to shift more
of the risk of future expansion onto the manufacturers, as opposed to the
franchisee dealers.
The motor vehicle statute was amended in other ways as well. The
statute made more explicit the factors that a manufacturer may consider
when reviewing an application to transfer ownership in a dealer.137 The
statute makes it unreasonable for a manufacturer to require a dealer "to
substantially change, alter, or remodel" an existing dealership prior to ten
years after the last such change, provided that the last change was made
in compliance with the manufacturer's specifications. 138 Manufacturers
are now required to pay dealer claims under incentive programs within
thirty days after the claim is approved. 139 The claim will be deemed ap-
proved unless it is rejected within thirty-one days of receipt, and manu-
facturers must provide written notice with the reasons for rejection. 140
Finally, there are new provisions regarding the use of customer informa-
131. Id. § 57.401(a).
132. Act of May 27, 2011, 82d Leg., R.S., ch. 137, §§ 1-17, 2011 Tex. Sess. Law Serv.
449, 644 (West) (current version at TEX. Occ. CODE ANN. §§ 2301.002, et seq. (West
2012)).
133. TEX. Occ. CODE ANN. § 2301.4651.
134. Id. § 2301.4651(a).
135. Id. § 2301.4651(b).
136. Act of May 27, 2011, 82d Leg., R.S., ch. 137, §§ 16-17.
137. TEX. Occ. CODE ANN. § 2301.359.
138. Id. § 2301.467.




tion, property use agreements, and the right of a dealer to protest
relocations. 141
C. BOAT MANUFACTURERS, DISTRIBUTORS, AND DEALERS STATUTE
The Texas boat manufacturers, distributors, and dealers statute was re-
vised in 2011.142 The most significant change is the removal of the re-
quirement of good cause for termination, and its replacement with a
prohibition on termination by a manufacturer or distributor unless the
dealer "defaults" as defined by the statute.143 The statute defines "de-
fault," in general, as a "material" failure to meet the distribution agree-
ment's requirements. 144 The manufacturer must give the dealer notice
and a period in which to cure a default, which varies from 30 days to 180
days, depending upon the particular breach. 145 The provision that good
cause is not required for the nonrenewal of an agreement was not
changed. 146
The statute was amended in several other ways as well. A prohibition
on the appointment of a second "authorized dealer" in an established
dealer's territory is now a statutory mandate. 147 Manufacturers now must
make "reasonable efforts" to provide their dealers with information con-
cerning the dealer's compliance with the agreed-upon performance stan-
dards, which now must be evaluated annually. 148 In addition, the statute
was changed to clarify that it applies to persons who sell new boats and
new boat motors, outboard and inboard, to dealers, and it amends the
definition of "dealer" to require buying, selling, displaying, or exchanging
a minimum of five boats per calendar year.149 Note that these changes
only affect agreements entered into on or after September 1, 2011.150
Although the removal of the "good cause" provision and its replace-
ment with new, more detailed statutory requirements appears to provide
more certainty as to when termination is warranted, a closer look at the
new requirements shows that, in most cases, argument over what is "good
cause" will simply be replaced by argument over what is "material." For
example, the listed "defaults" under the statute include a "material fail-
ure" to meet stocking requirements and a "material failure" to pay obli-
gations to the manufacturer. 151 Consequently, the new provisions
141. Id. § 2301.480-82, 2301.6521-22.
142. Act of June 17, 2011, 82d Leg., R.S., ch. 1148, §§ 1-14, 2011 Tex. Sess. Law Serv.
2769, 2966 (West) (current version at TEX. Occ. CODE ANN. §§ 2352.001 et seq. (West
Supp. 2011)).
143. TEX. Occ. CODE ANN. § 2352.053(a).
144. Id. § 2352.0523.
145. Id. § 2352.0524.
146. Id. § 2352.053(b).
147. Id. § 2352.0522(a).
148. Id. § 2352.0521.
149. Id. § 2352.001.
150. Act of June 17, 2011, 82d Leg., R.S., ch. 1148, §§ 13-14, 2011 Tex. Sess. Law Serv.
2769, 2977 (West).
151. TEX. Occ. CODE ANN. § 2352.0523(a)(1)-(2).
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requiring manufacturers to make "reasonable efforts" to provide distrib-
utors with information concerning compliance with performance stan-
dards may be the most meaningful changes to the statute.
IV. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
A. UNAUTHORIZED USE
In re MCC Humble Auto Paint, Inc. 152 shows how a franchisor may act
to protect its intellectual property in the bankruptcy context. In Humble,
Maaco terminated a Texas franchisee for failure to pay franchisee fees.153
After the termination, Maaco filed suit in federal court in Pennsylvania
and sought a preliminary injunction to force the former franchisee to de-
identify as a Maaco franchise.154 The franchisee filed for bankruptcy
under Chapter 11 in Texas on the day of the scheduled preliminary-in-
junction hearing. 55 Maaco then sought relief from the automatic stay in
the bankruptcy court to seek an injunction to prevent the former fran-
chisee from conducting any operations.' 56
An interested party in a bankruptcy proceeding may seek to lift the
automatic stay "for cause. ' 157 Cause is determined by a "totality of cir-
cumstances" standard. 158 The testimony in the case showed that, al-
though the debtor had taken certain steps to stop using Maaco's
intellectual property, it still had Maaco signs up and used the Maaco
name on employee uniforms and business cards. 159 The Humble court
held that, "[w]ith respect to cause, it is clear that Debtor should not be
permitted to use the Maaco name.' 60 Although the bankruptcy court
found the debtor's testimony as to its efforts to stop using the Maaco
name credible, it held that there was a "substantial risk of harm" to
Maaco to the extent that it had not completed its efforts. 161 The court
held that, although Maaco should not be permitted to seek an injunction
to stop the debtor from conducting "all" business, "the automatic stay
should be conditioned on Debtor's removal of Maaco signs and
identification. "162
Humble shows that bankruptcy courts are willing to take steps to pro-
tect a franchisor's intellectual property. Although the "for cause" stan-
dard in the automatic-stay context is somewhat nebulous, the Humble
court was clear that protection of intellectual property is an extremely
152. In re MCC Humble Auto Paint, Inc., No. 11-34994-H3-11, 2011 WL 3799764, at
*2-3 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. Aug. 25, 2011).
153. Id. at *1.
154. Id. at *1-2.
155. Id. at *2.
156. Id.
157. Id. at *3; see 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(1) (2006).
158. In re MCC Humble, 2011 WL 3799764, at *3 (citing In re Reitnauer, 152 F.3d 341,
343 n.4 (5th Cir. 1998)).
159. Id. at *2.





important consideration. Still, the Humble court did not grant Maaco all
the relief it requested, and instead of shutting down the debtor, the court
conditioned the protection of the stay on the completion of de-identifica-
tion, which is a reminder that bankruptcy courts are ultimately courts of
equity.
The Eastern District of Texas provided a comprehensive discussion of
the laches defense to trademark infringement in Gruma Corp. v. Mexican
Restaurants, Inc., which is particularly relevant to prospective
franchisors. 163 In Gruma, a trademark holder, Gruma, sued MRI after it
learned that MRI was planning to embark on a franchising campaign to
offer "Mission Burritos" franchises to third-parties. 164 MRI asserted the
defense of laches, arguing that Gruma knew or should have known about
its use of the "Mission Burritos" trademark since 1995, fourteen years
before filing suit, and that the delay in filing was "inexcusable" and
caused prejudice to MRI.165 In deciding Gruma's partial motion for sum-
mary judgment, the court analyzed the laches defense separately as to (1)
MRI's native Houston-area restaurants, and (2) its plans to expand
outside the Houston area.
For the Houston-area locations, the court held that questions of fact
existed as to the laches defense.166 Specifically, the court found that a
reasonable jury could conclude that knowledge of MRI's ongoing alleged
infringement in Houston by one of Gruma's employees, who was in
charge of retail sales for the Houston area, should be imputed to Gruma
for laches purposes. 167 The court found that a fact question existed as to
whether MRI's ongoing alleged infringement meant that Gruma should
have known of the infringement based on MRI's open use of the trade-
marks in question.' 68
The court analyzed the planned franchising-based expansion differ-
ently. The court found that the laches defense did not apply to the
planned expansion. 169 Citing Conan Properties, Inc. v. Conans Pizza,
Inc.,170 the court held that for purposes of an injunction regarding the
expansion, it did not matter "[w]hen Gruma first learned of the alleged
infringement" in Houston.' 71 Following Conan Properties, the court rea-
soned that Gruma should not be barred from asserting its rights outside
the Houston area based on de minimis local infringement because, other-
wise, trademark owners such as Gruma would be forced to bring infringe-
163. Gruma Corp. v. Mexican Rests., Inc., No. 4:09-CV-488, 2010 WL 5390139 (E.D.
Tex. Dec. 2, 2010), adopted by 2010 WL 5387624, at *2-4 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 22, 2010).
164. Gruma, 2010 WL 5390139, at *1.
165. Id. at *2-3.
166. Id. at *5.
167. Id. (citing In re Hellenic, 252 F.3d 391, 395 (5th Cir. 2001)).
168. Id.
169. Id. at *6.
170. Conan Props., Inc. v. Conans Pizza, Inc., 752 F.2d 145 (5th Cir. 1985).
171. Gruma Corp., 2010 WL 5390139, at *7-8.
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ment suits in all such de minimis situations.172 Finally, the court rejected
MRI's argument that Gruma's failure to sue other infringers should estop
it from suing MRI, holding that, "Nowhere does the Fifth Circuit state
that not protecting a mark against one defendant's infringement pre-
cludes protecting the same mark against the infringement of another. 173
Gruma thus provides a cautionary note for future franchisors. Even if
a prospective franchisor has been immune from trademark litigation to
date in its original home market, due diligence is called for before em-
barking on an expansion plan. Relying on a laches defense to trademark-
infringement claims once expansion plans are announced may be
unsuccessful.
B. CYBER SQUATrING
Last year's Texas franchise-law update included discussion of a cyber-
squatting case, Century 21 Real Estate LLC v. Gharbi1 74 Century 21 in-
volved a terminated Century 21 franchisee's continued use of websites
containing Century 21's trademarks.175 The Bankruptcy Court for the
Western District of Texas held that there was insufficient evidence to
grant summary judgment to the franchisor, Century 21, on its Anticyber-
squatting Consumer Protection Act ("ACPA") claim because the failure
to modify the websites as soon as a franchise is terminated is not necessa-
rily evidence of the "bad faith" required under the ACPA.176 On March
3, 2011, the court followed up its earlier opinion with a holding that the
franchisee, Gharbi, was in fact liable under the ACPA.177
The court again noted that unlike in many ACPA cases, in this case
Gharbi had the legal right to use the Century 21 trademarks in his web-
sites at the time he registered them.178 The court still found that Gharbi
had a bad faith intent to profit from the use of a trademarked name,
however, because (1) he did not have any rights in the name after termi-
nation, and (2) after termination Gharbi instructed his website-hosting
company to use his Century 21-marked websites as "pointers" to direct
traffic to a new website.17 9 The court held that the ACPA's "safe harbor"
provision-providing that there can be no finding of bad faith if "reason-
able grounds to believe that the use of a domain name was a fair use or
172. Id. at *8 ("Even if the Court accepts MRI's argument that Gruma should have
known of MRI's predecessor's use of 'Mission Burrito' as early as 1995, laches does not bar
Gruma's injunction so far as it seeks to enjoin use outside the Houston, Texas area.").
173. Id.
174. Century 21 Real Estate LLC v. Gharbi, No. 08-11023-CAG, Chapter 7, Adv. No.
08-01099-CAG, 2010 Bankr. LEXIS 1247 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. April 19, 2010), see Deborah
S. Coldwell, Altresha Q. Burchett-Williams, William D. White, and Suzanne A. Loonam
Trigg, Franchise Law, 64 SMU L. REV. 295, 311-12, 318-19 (2011).
175. See Coldwell et al., supra note 174, at 311.
176. Id. at 312.
177. Century 21 Real Estate LLC v. Gharbi, No. 08-11023-CAG, Adv. No. 08-01099-
CAG, 2011 WL 831706, at *6 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. Mar. 3, 2011).
178. Id. at *5.
179. Id. at *5-6.
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otherwise lawful" exist-was inapplicable because it was clear from the
franchise termination notice that Gharbi no longer had lawful use of the
Century 21 marks.180
Century 21 provides a lesson for franchisors. Given the ACPA's re-
quirement of an explicit finding of bad faith, 181 and the statute's "reason-
able grounds" safe harbor, 82 it is important for a franchisor to make
clear in a termination notice that any right to use a previously licensed
trademark, in a domain name or otherwise, is immediately terminated.
In addition, although the Century 21 court did not hesitate to find the
practice of using a trademarked website as a "pointer" to a new site as
evidence of bad faith, it may be prudent for a franchisor to list such ac-
tions as specifically prohibited practices after termination, in a franchise
or license agreement.
V. COMMON LAW CLAIMS
A. CONTRACT ISSUES
A TC Healthcare Services, Inc. v. New Century Financial, Inc.183 aptly
demonstrates the importance of due diligence when entering into a
franchise relationship with an established business. Chicago Nurses, Inc.
operated a medical staffing agency and had a factoring arrangement with
New Century Financial, whereby New Century managed collections for
Chicago Nurses in exchange for providing up-front, discounted pay-
ment.184 New Century also had a perfected security interest in Chicago
Nurses' accounts receivable.1 85 After this arrangement had existed for
some time, Chicago Nurses entered into a franchise agreement with med-
ical staffing franchisor ATC Healthcare Services, Inc. 186 As part of the
franchise arrangement, ATC took over collections from Chicago
Nurses. 187 Chicago Nurses failed to inform ATC of its arrangement with
New Century, however, and ATC failed to search for account liens.' 88
New Century brought suit to enforce its security interest.' 89
The A TC Healthcare Services opinion is a straightforward application
of Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code. New Century had a valid,
priority security interest in Chicago Nurses' accounts receivable. 190 The
court held that under the plain language of the security agreement and
Article 9, New Century's security interest continued even after ATC took
180. Id. at *6.
181. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(A)(i) (2006).
182. Id. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(ii).
183. ATC Healthcare Servs., Inc. v. New Century Fin., Inc., No. 01-10-00940-CV, 2011
WL 2739540 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st. Dist] July 14, 2011, no pet.).
184. Id. at *1.
185. Id. at *1-2.




190. Id. at *3-4.
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over the accounts. 191 Moreover, New Century's security interest ex-
tended to accounts created after the franchise agreement was entered by
virtue of the security agreement's "'hereafter acquired"' language.192
ATC Healthcare Services therefore shows that a franchisor considering
entering into a franchise arrangement with an existing business should
not rely only on the representations and warranties of the prospective
franchisee, but should conduct its own due diligence. As in A TC Health-
care Services, there may be third parties with enforceable priority rights
that could directly impact the franchisor. Although, presumably, the
franchisor would have a breach-of-representation or warranty remedy
against its franchisee in such a case, the prospect of full recovery may be
unclear. A certain amount of independent, prior due diligence, such as a
UCC lien search, could prevent problems before they arise.
The Dallas Court of Appeals affirmed the continuing viability of the
parol evidence rule in W.O. Burgers 1, L.L.C. v. Watsonburger of
Oklahoma, Inc.193 In that case, W.O. Burgers entered into an operating
agreement, trademark license, and commercial lease agreement with
Watsonburger for a hamburger restaurant in Ardmore, Oklahoma. 194
Burgers contended that it also entered into an oral agreement with Wat-
sonburger for Burgers to manage a Watsonburger store in Durant,
Oklahoma. 195 Burgers eventually abandoned the Ardmore store and
sued Watsonburger for violations of the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices
and Consumer Protection Act, fraud, and breach of contract. 196
The trial court rendered a verdict for Watsonburger.197 Burgers argued
on appeal that the trial court erred in excluding evidence of its oral agree-
ment with Watsonburger to manage the Durant store. 198 The court held
that each of the three written contracts between Burgers and Wat-
sonburger referred specifically to the Ardmore store, and that "evidence
of an oral agreement to operate an additional store alters and contradicts
the three unambiguous Ardmore Agreements in violation of the parol
evidence rule."199 W.O. Burgers, therefore, provides a reminder of the
importance of the parol-evidence-rule defense in franchise cases, where
the parties' relationship is often defined by very specific contractual
agreements.
B. VICARIOUS LIABILITY
In Harris v. Houston Livestock Show & Rodeo, Inc., the Houston
Court of Appeals affirmed that a franchise and distribution relationship
191. Id. at *4.
192. Id.
193. W.O. Burgers 1, L.L.C. v. Watsonburger of Okla., Inc., No. 05-09-00397-CV, 2011
WL 989051, at *2 (Tex. App.-Dallas Mar. 22, 2011, pet. denied).





199. Id. at *2 (citing David J. Sacks, P.C. v. Haden, 266 S.W.3d 447, 450 (Tex. 2008)).
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does not by itself give rise to joint-interest liability.200 In Harris, the
plaintiffs brought suit under the Dram Shop Act against Corral Club and
Houston Livestock Show & Rodeo, Inc. after an individual who was pro-
vided free alcohol at a bar run by the Corral Club, seriously injured the
plaintiffs in a motor-vehicle accident. 20 1 Houston Livestock and the Cor-
ral Club had an agreement in which the Corral Club was allowed to sell
alcohol during Houston Livestock's shows in exchange for paying Hous-
ton Livestock a share of its total revenue.20 2
The court analyzed whether Houston Livestock could be vicariously
liable with Corral Club under a joint-enterprise theory. The elements of
a joint enterprise are: (1) an express or implied agreement, (2) a common
purpose, (3) a "community of pecuniary interest," and (4) "an equal right
to direct and control the enterprise. '20 3 The court held that the third
element did not exist in this case.204 The court affirmed that, "[A]n indi-
rect, potential financial interest, such as the interest of a franchisor con-
cerning the success of its franchisee, is insufficient to constitute a
community of pecuniary interest in the common purpose. ' 20 5 The court
noted that the percentage of total revenue received by Houston Live-
stock was a different interest from the revenue-minus-expenses received
by the Corral Club.20 6 Harris, therefore, reinforces that in order to find
joint-enterprise liability in a franchise or distribution relationship, there
must be some financial connection between the parties, in addition to a
traditional royalty as a percentage of revenue.
VI. STATUTORY CLAIMS
A. ANTITRUST
On February 22, 2011, the United States Supreme Court denied PSKS's
latest certiorari petition, refusing to review its landmark 2007 decision in
Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc. (Leegin I).207 Thus,
manufacturers requiring resale price maintenance (RPM or vertical price
fixing) agreements can continue to rely on Leegin I, which struck down
the Court's long-standing precedent that such agreements are per se vio-
lations of the Sherman Act.20 8
Leegin manufactured and distributed handbags and other "Brighton"
brand products. 209 PSKS, the owner of a retail store that sold Brighton
200. Harris v. Houston Livestock Show & Rodeo, Inc., 365 S.W.3d 28, 35 (Tex. App.-
Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, pet. denied).
201. Id. at 31.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 34.
204. Id.
205. Id. (citing St. Joseph Hosp. v. Wolff, 94 S.W.3d 513, 532 (Tex. 2003)).
206. Id.
207. PSKS, Inc. v. Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc., 615 F.3d 412 (5th Cir. 2010),
cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1476 (2011) (refusing to review Leegin Creative Leather Products,
Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877 (2007) (Leegin I).
208. Leegin I, 551 U.S. at 881-82.
209. PSKS, Inc., 615 F.3d at 414.
[Vol. 65
Franchise Law
products, violated Leegin's RPM policy, which set the lowest price that
resellers could charge their customers, by selling Brighton products at a
discounted price.210 When Leegin stopped selling Brighton products to
PSKS, PSKS sued Leegin for violations of the Sherman Act.211 A jury
awarded nearly $4 million to PSKS, a decision which was appealed and
affirmed by the Fifth Circuit pursuant to Dr. Miles'2 12 per se rule.213
In Leegin I, the United States Supreme Court overturned Dr. Miles'
per se rule relating to RPM agreements. 214 In its 2007 decision, the Court
determined that RPM agreements are no longer per se violations of the
Sherman Act.215 Rather, such agreements are to be evaluated under "the
rule of reason," which weighs the pro-competitive effects of RPM agree-
ments against their anticompetitive effects. 216
On remand, PSKS amended its complaint, alleging that Leegin was in-
volved in a horizontal price-fixing conspiracy and that consumers were
required to pay artificially high and anticompetitive prices for Brighton
products.21 7 The Fifth Circuit affirmed the lower court's dismissal, which
applied the new rule-of-reason set forth in Leegin I, for failure to prop-
erly plead a relevant market in which to perform the rule-of-reason anal-
ysis. 218 The Fifth Circuit held that PSKS did not meet its burden of
establishing that Leegin's actions had harmed competition because PSKS
failed to sufficiently define the relevant products and markets.219 The
two alternative markets proposed by PSKS failed to take into account
"interchangeable substitute products" or recognize the "cross-elasticity of
demand" for Brighton products. 220 Brighton did not constitute its own
market, nor did "'wholesale sale,"' which focused on the distribution
level instead of the product.221 In addition, PSKS did not allege any fac-
tors indicating an anticompetitive effect. 222 For example, the court re-
jected Leegin's claim that the RPM arrangement resulted in "'artificially'
high prices" and stated that this argument "defies the basic laws of eco-
nomics" because absent market power, increased prices "would merely
cause [Leegin] to lose sales. '223 Nor did PSKS assert that a group of
retailers or one dominant retailer was the source of the RPM policy.224
The Fifth Circuit also rejected PSKS's horizontal-restraint claim because
the pleadings did not allege that "retailers were the source of the price
210. Id. at 415.
211. Id.
212. Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911).
213. Id.
214. Leegin L, 551 U.S. at 881-82, 907.
215. Id.
216. Id. at 882.
217. PSKS, Inc., 615 F.3d at 416.
218. Id. at 417-18.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 418.
221. Id.





restraint. ' 225 Nor were Leegin's actions as a "dual distributor" support-
ive of PSKS's horizontal-restraint claim.226
In denying PSKS's petition for writ of certiorari, the United States Su-
preme Court agreed with the Fifth Circuit's application of the rule of rea-
son. However, depending on the state law that applies, uncertainty still
exists for manufacturers wanting to control resale prices, as some states
hold that RPM arrangements are per se illegal. 227 Although some states
approach RPM arrangements as per se violations, Texas looks to federal
judicial interpretations of the Sherman Act in applying its state antitrust
law. 228 Thus, at least when federal or Texas law applies, manufacturers
can continue to rely on Leegin I in structuring their RPM policies. In
these situations, a substantial legal risk to RPM agreements has been
removed.
VII. REMEDIES: DAMAGES AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
A. ATrORNEYS' FEES
In Bennigan's Franchising Co. v. Team Irish, Inc., (Bennigan's I), the
Northern District of Texas considered whether Bennigan's was a prevail-
ing party entitled to attorneys' fees when the parties entered into an
agreed judgment, settling only a portion of Bennigan's claims.229 The
court also considered whether the amount of attorneys' fees should be
limited to the claim settled.230 Ultimately, the court determined that
Bennigan's was a prevailing party under the parties' franchise agreement,
which entitled Bennigan's to attorneys' fees; however, the attorneys' fees
were limited to those incurred for the settled claim only. 231
Bennigan's I involved a typical dispute over violations of a develop-
ment agreement and the failure to pay royalties.232 The franchisor and
franchisee entered into an agreed judgment, in which the parties stipu-
lated to an award for past-due royalties in favor of Bennigan's, but not
for the other four claims.233 In the agreed judgment, Bennigan's was spe-
cifically given the right to seek attorneys' fees. 234 In addition, the
franchise agreement awarded "costs and expenses incurred, including
225. Id. at 420.
226. Id. at 420-21.
227. See, e.g., George Miller Brick Co. v. Stark Ceramics, Inc., 801 N.Y.S.2d 120, 126
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2005); Kunert v. Mission Fin. Servs. Corp., 1 Cal. Rptr. 3d 589, 605 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2003).
228. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 15.04 (West 2011) (providing that the Texas Anti-
trust Act "shall be construed in harmony with federal judicial interpretations of compara-
ble federal antitrust statutes.").
229. Bennigan's Franchising Co. v. Team Irish, Inc., No. 3:11-CV-0364-D, 2011 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 99736, at *7-8 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 6, 2011) (Haynes and Boone attorneys
Deborah S. Coldwell, Altresha Q. Burchett-Williams, and Katie Dolan-Galaviz represent
Bennigan's in this matter).
230. Id. at *14-17.
231. Id. at *15-16.
232. Id. at *2-3.




reasonable accounting and legal fees," to the prevailing party in a pro-
ceeding involving amounts owed by the franchisee or enforcement of the
franchise agreement. 235 Bennigan's argued that it was entitled to attor-
neys' fees and costs pursuant to the franchise agreement, the develop-
ment agreement, the agreed judgment, and section 38.001(8) of the Texas
Civil Practice and Remedies Code.236
After determining that the right to attorneys' fees should be analyzed
under the franchise agreement, the court next considered whether Benni-
gan's was a prevailing party pursuant to the franchise agreement.237 The
franchisee argued that Bennigan's was not a prevailing party because the
past-due royalties award was only conceded in the course of settlement,
and the agreed judgment did not address the remaining four claims.238
The court disagreed, holding that Bennigan's was a prevailing party be-
cause Bennigan's "'obtained an enforceable judgment against the defen-
dant[s] from whom fees [were] sought, or comparable relief through a
consent decree or settlement.'1,239
The lack of success on all claims was, however, relevant to the amount
of fees that could be awarded. Although Bennigan's sought recovery for
all fees incurred pursuing its claims, the court limited the fees to those
incurred in litigating the settled claim for past-due royalties. 240 Thus,
Bennigan's was given additional time to segregate fees incurred for the
past-due royalties claim from the unrecoverable claims, or to "establish
that segregation is not required because the.. . 'legal services advance[d]
both a recoverable and unrecoverable claim.'"241 Anticipated appellate
fees were denied without prejudice for reconsideration following an ac-
tual appeal.242
In Bennigan's II, the court considered the supplemental fee application
filed by Bennigan's, which represented a 15% reduction for fees incurred
in litigating claims on which it did not prevail.243 In addition, Bennigan's
sought fees for post-judgment briefing.244 The court determined that the
reduction of fees by 15% satisfied Bennigan's obligation to segregate re-
coverable from unrecoverable fees, and that the fees for litigating the
claim and for post-judgment briefing were "reasonable and necessary. '245
The Bennigan's franchise agreement contained typical wording that
might need to be retooled given the holding in Bennigan's I. Although
235. Id. at *6 n.4.
236. Id. at *4-5.
237. Id. at *12-14.
238. Id. at *12.
239. Id. at *13 (quoting Intercontinental Group P'ship v. KB Home Lone Star L.P., 295
S.W.3d 650, 654 (Tex. 2009)).
240. Id. at *15-16.
241. Id. at *18 (internal citation omitted).
242. Id. at *19.
243. Bennigan's Franchising Co. v. Team Irish, Inc. No. 3:11-CV-0364-D, 2011 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 136032, at *5-7 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 28, 2011).
244. Id. at *13.
245. Id. at *12-13.
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Bennigan's H approved a small reduction for attorneys' fees incurred in
litigating unrecoverable fees, parties may want to consider modifying
their franchise agreements so that fees incurred in litigating both recover-
able and unrecoverable claims can be sought. If the parties desire this
result, the franchise agreements should allow for the recovery of "all at-
torney fees" should the franchisor prevail as to "any claim" arising out of
the franchise agreement or the relationship of the parties.
B. PUNITIVE DAMAGES
As discussed above in section IV, the Century 21 court determined that
the debtor violated the ACPA.246 Without evidence of Gharbi's business
records (which Gharbi testified were destroyed by vandals) Century 21
opted to seek statutory damages under 15 U.S.C. § 1117(d). 247 Under
this section, a plaintiff can seek an amount between $1,000 and $100,000
per offending domain name. 248 Century 21 argued that it should be
awarded the maximum award of $300,000, or $100,000 per violation,
given Gharbi's "'flagrant and unauthorized"' use of Century 21 marks, as
well as the fact that the Gharbi had destroyed the very evidence that
would allow the calculation of specific money damages. 249 After noting
the lack of guidance in the statute, the Century 21 court concluded that
the Fifth Circuit gave the court "wide discretion in determining the
amount of statutory damages" and required that ACPA statutory dam-
ages, like copyright statutory damages, "not merely compel restitution of
profit and reparation for injury but also . . . discourage wrongful con-
duct. '250 Although the court noted that Gharbi's conduct was "clearly
wrong and intentional," given Gharbi's continued use of the sites after
being asked to take them down and warned that continued use could be
illegal, the court did not believe that Gharbi's conduct warranted an
award of the maximum damages.25 1 The court therefore assessed statu-
tory damages of $75,000, or $25,000 for each website.2 52
Turning to attorneys' fees, the court next determined whether this was
an "exceptional case" that warranted an award of reasonable attorneys'
fees under 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a). 253 The court applied the Fifth Circuit's
definition of "exceptional cases" as those that involve "malicious, fraudu-
246. Century 21 Real Estate LLC v. Gharbi, No. 08-11023-CAG, Chapter 7, Adv. No.
08-01099-CAG, 2011 Bankr. LEXIS 864, at *30 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. Mar. 3, 2011).
247. Id. at *18-19,19 n.3.
248. Id. at *19-20. (Section 1117(d) provides that "plaintiff may elect ... to recover,
instead of actual damages and profits, an award of statutory damages in the amount of not
less than $1,000 and not more than $100,000 per domain name, as the Court considers
just.").
249. Id. at *20.
250. Id. at *22 (quoting E. & J. Gallo Winery v. Spider Webs Ltd., 286 F.3d 270, 278
(5th Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks omitted).
251. Id. at *23.
252. Id.
253. Id. at *23-24.
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lent, deliberate, or willful" acts.254 The Century 21 court determined that
this case was exceptional, given that Gharbi "acted with the bad faith
intent to profit from [p]laintiff's marks" and also acted willfully in keep-
ing the websites in operation and as pointers when he was aware of the
consequences and was told to stop using the marks.255 Gharbi, who rep-
resented himself pro se at trial, was therefore ordered to pay Century 21's
attorneys' fees.256
The court next determined whether Gharbi's debt to Century 21 was
dischargeable under the Bankruptcy Code, which would mean that the
judgment discussed above would be uncollectible. 257 Under 11 U.S.C.
§ 523(a)(6) of the Bankruptcy Code, recoveries for "willful and mali-
cious" injuries are not dischargeable. 258 In order to qualify as a "willful
or malicious" act, "'a debtor must have acted with objective substantial
certainty or subjective motive to inflict injury." 259 The court discussed
the objective and subjective standards set forth by the Fifth Circuit to
determine whether Gharbi's conduct was willful and malicious. 260 The
court found that Gharbi's conduct was both objectively and subjectively
willful and malicious. First, Gharbi's conduct was objectively willful and
malicious because he "knew that he would cause harm to the [p]laintiff if
he continued to operate the websites. '2 61 Second, the conduct was sub-
jectively willful and malicious because Gharbi, "in knowing disregard of
the rights of the [p]laintiff, continued to operate the domain names. '262
The court found that Gharbi knew he did not have the right to continue
to use Century 21's name after his franchise was terminated and contin-
ued to use the marks even after he was warned to shut down.263
Century 21 gives franchisors a powerful weapon to prevent former
franchisees from cybersquatting after termination of the franchise agree-
ment. Even if a franchisor cannot prove damages, the franchisee can be
held liable for up to $100,000 for each infringing website, plus attorneys'
fees. Furthermore, if a bankrupt franchisee commits a "willful and mali-
cious" injury, the debt is not dischargeable in bankruptcy.
C. INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
As discussed in section IV, in In re Humble Auto Paint, Inc., Maaco, a
franchisor of vehicle-painting and body-repair centers, sued its franchisee
in a Pennsylvania district court, seeking injunctive relief to enforce its
254. Id. at *24 (citing Schlotzsky's, Ltd. v. Sterling Purchasing and Nat'l Distrib. Co.,
520 F.3d 393, 402 (5th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
255. Id. at *24.
256. Id.
257. Id. at *25.
258. Id.
259. Id. (quoting In re Williams, 337 F.3d 504, 508-09 (5th Cir. 2003)) (internal quota-
tion marks omitted).
260. Id. at *25-27.
261. Id. at *27-28.
262. Id. at *29.
263. Id. at *29-30.
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noncompetition covenants, post-termination. 264 On the date of the pre-
liminary hearing in Pennsylvania, the franchisee filed for bankruptcy in
Texas, thereby staying the Pennsylvania litigation.265 In the Texas bank-
ruptcy case, Maaco then filed a motion to lift the automatic stay to pre-
vent the debtor franchisee "from conducting any operations. ''266 At the
hearing, the debtor testified that he was no longer operating as a Maaco
Center and had taken steps to de-identify, but that the Maaco signs on
the building had not been removed because the debtor could not afford
to do so. 267
Maaco first argued that the stay should be lifted because the debtor no
longer had a property interest in the franchise agreement, which was
properly terminated pre-petition.268 The court rejected this argument,
finding that the debtor "ha[d] not asserted [a] property interest in the
[terminated] franchise agreement. ' 269 Second, Maaco argued that the
stay should be lifted for cause under 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(1), because
Maaco's intellectual property, as reflected in its signage and goodwill, was
not adequately protected.270 Although it was clear to the court that the
debtor could no longer use Maaco's name, and that the debtor must
therefore fully de-identify, the court allowed the debtor to continue oper-
ating as an independent body shop because "the hardship to Maaco d[id]
not outweigh the hardship to [the] [d]ebtor" that would result from hav-
ing to close its business. 271 Therefore, the court conditioned the auto-
matic stay on the debtor's removal of all signs and identification. 272 The
enforceability of the covenant not to compete was not presented in the
motion to lift the automatic stay, but may be raised by Maaco in the
future.
D. MOTOR VEHICLE DEALER STATUTORY DAMAGES
As discussed in Part III supra, during the last legislative session, addi-
tional protections were given to dealerships in Texas. These protections
appear to address the economic conditions faced by the retail automobile
industry in recent years and certain practices by manufacturers and dis-
tributors that the Legislature believed jeopardize the viability of
franchised dealerships. Effective September 1, 2011, motor vehicle man-
ufacturers, distributors, and representatives are required to make addi-
tional payments to a dealer whose franchise was terminated or
discontinued under certain situations.273 Under Senate Bill 529, addi-
264. In re MCC Humble Auto Paint, Inc., No. 11-34994-H3-11, 2011 Bankr. LEXIS
3288, at *4-6 (Bank. S. D. Tex. Aug. 25, 2011) (mem. op.).
265. Id. at *4.
266. Id. at *6.
267. Id. at *5-6.
268. Id. at *6.
269. Id. at *8.
270. Id. at *6.
271. Id. at *8-9.
272. Id. at *9
273. See TEX. Occ. CODE ANN. § 2301.4651 (West 2004 & Supp. 2011).
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tional payments to dealers are required when a dealer is terminated in
violation of Texas termination statutes or when a franchisor "terminates
or discontinues a franchise by discontinuing a line-make, ceasing to do
business in this state, or changing the distributor or method of distribu-
tion of its products" in Texas. 274 In these situations, the manufacturer is
required to pay the dealer: (1) construction costs for dealerships con-
structed within two years of termination or rent; (2) upgrade costs made
in the two years preceding termination; and (3) the value of goodwill as-
sociated with the franchise.275 The amount of the payments required is
based on the percentage of total square feet "attributable to sales, ser-
vice, and parts suggested by a manufacturer or distributor" and allocated
to the terminated or discontinued franchise. 276 In addition, the manufac-
turer, distributor, or representative must pay the terminated dealer "the
depreciated value of computer software that was recommended and re-
quired in writing by the manufacturer, distributor, or representative. ' '277
VIII. CONCLUSION
During the Survey period, several United States Supreme Court cases
impacted how franchise and distribution companies will do business in
Texas and throughout the United States. For example, in Goodyear
Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown and J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd.
v. Nicastro, the Supreme Court narrowed a state court's ability to exercise
personal jurisdiction over nonresident defendants. In addition, the Su-
preme Court denied certiorari and refused to review its landmark 2007
decision in Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S.
877 (2007). At least when federal or Texas law applies, manufacturers
can continue to rely on Leegin I, which overturned the Court's previous
rule that retail price maintenance agreements were per se violations of
the Sherman Act.
Similar to past years, Texas and federal courts also reaffirmed the con-
tractual nature of the relationship between franchisors and franchisees by
enforcing a Texas forum-selection clause in Safety-Kleen Systems, Inc. v.
McCoy Freightliner, Inc. and by compelling arbitration in The Salad Bowl
Franchise Corp. v. Mason Crane. In W.O. Burgers 1, L.L.C. v. Wat-
sonburger of Oklahoma, Inc., a Texas appellate court also stressed the
importance of the written agreement between the parties by affirming the
continuing viability of the parol evidence rule.
Throughout the past year, franchisors and other trademark owners also
sought to protect their intellectual property rights. In Gruma Corp. v.
274. Tex. S.B. 529, 82d Leg., R.S. (2011), (current version at TEX. Occ. CODE ANN.
§ 2301.4651(a) (West 2004 & Supp. 2011)).
275. Id. (current version at TEX. Occ. CODE ANN. § 2301.4651(b) (West 2004 & Supp.
2011)).
276. Id. (current version at TEX. Occ. CODE ANN. § 2301.4651(d) (West 2004 & Supp.
2011)).




Mexican Restaurants, Inc., the court determined that a trademark owner
could seek an injunction prohibiting the use of its marks outside of a pro-
spective franchisor's original home market, despite the fact that the pro-
spective franchisor had been using the marks since 1995. Thus, relying on
a laches defense to trademark infringement claims to expand may be un-
successful. In Century 21 Real Estate LLC v. Gharbi, the court found that
the terminated franchisee was liable under the ACPA for continued use
of Century 21 trademarks post termination. Notably, the "safe harbor"
provision of the ACPA was not applicable since it was clear from the
franchise termination notice that the former franchisee could no longer
lawfully use the Century 21 marks. Furthermore, because of the former
franchisee's willful and malicious conduct in continuing to use the trade-
marks post-termination, the debt to Century 21 was not dischargeable
under the Bankruptcy Code.
Finally, to address the economic and financial conditions faced by deal-
ers and distributors, the 82nd Legislature of Texas made significant statu-
tory changes concerning motor vehicle dealers, boat dealers, and
"equipment" dealers. In particular, these statutes address the right to ter-
minate a dealership or distributorship. For example, a motor-vehicle
manufacturer must now make additional payments to a dealer when the
dealership is terminated in certain circumstances, including discontinuing
a line-make, ceasing to do business in Texas, or changing the distributor
or method of distribution in Texas.
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